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Bu çalışmada, Türkiye'de tüketiminin yanısıra Avrupa ülkelerine de ihraç edilen orciğin fabrika otomasyon sistemi ile üretimine yönelik bir benzetimi yapılmıştır. Doğal klasik yöntemlerle üretilen orciğin her bir üretim aşaması ele alınarak Programlanabilir Mantıksal Denetleyici (PLC) otomasyon sistemi ile tasarımı yapılmış ve SCADA üzerinde benzet...
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The massive use of information technology has brought certain security risks to the industrial production process. In recent years, cyber-physical attacks against industrial control systems have occurred frequently. Anomaly detection technology is an essential technical means to ensure the safety of industrial control systems. Considering the short...
A tower vibration monitoring method based on XGBoost is proposed to predict the tower vibration trends under different operating conditions. Firstly, the wind turbine operating conditions are classified based on the Kmeans clustering algorithm. Secondly, the impact of state parameters of the wind turbine on the tower vibration is analyzed, and the...
Citations
... The terms related to incident response in SCADA systems are introduced in (Eden et al., 2015). Other conceptualization studies in the form of proper ontology structure have addressed the investigation process (Park et al., 2009). ...
... This scenario also happens to the SCADA network infrastructure which is increasingly vulnerable to DoS attacks due to the interconnection of SCADA to heterogeneous networks, especially SCADA systems used by power plants. In this study, the authors use a SCADA dataset with the IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104) protocol where the IEC 104 protocol will be encapsulated into TCP IP protocol before being transmitted [9][10] [11]. The IEC 104 protocol is widely used because it can use Automatic Generation Control (AGC) where the algorithm can adjust the electric power balance on a wide geographic scale [12]. ...
... Several studies on DoS attack detection have been carried out on traditional computer networks that use TCP/IP protocol. SCADA network with IEC 104 protocol usually uses TCP/IP protocol for transmitting a data packet [9][10] [11], so that DoS attacks on traditional computer networks can also be launched on SCADA networks running the IEC 104 protocol. Therefore, to detect DoS attack activities on SCADA networks running IEC 104 2021 8th International Conference on Electrical Engineering, Computer Science and Informatics (EECSI) 20-21 October 2021 protocol have similarities with DoS attacks detection on traditional computer networks but with adjustments for data packets that contain IEC 104, namely APCI (Application Protocol Control Information) and ASDU (Application Service Data Unit). ...
... As the protocol that used in this work is IEC 104, which in practice is encapsulated into TCP protocol before being sent, the treatment in recognizing attack patterns in this protocol is not much different from recognizing traditional network attack patterns on TCP/IP protocol [7], [8]. The dataset used in experimenting with the malicious activity features is the dataset that resulted from a testbed network introduced by Maynard et al [9] which is still in the form of a .pcap ...
... Fig. 3 shows the payload of one of the SYN Flood alerts detected in Suricata and Snort. Packets of SCADA communication networks running the IEC 104 protocol is encapsulated into packets of TCP protocol before being sent [7] [8]. There is a three-way handshaking mechanism that became a security hole for an attacker to perform an SYN flood attack, the attacker can make multiple half-open connections to the target without sending an ACK [15]. ...
... The researchers successfully perform IEC-104 flooding attack packet, TCP SYN DoS attack, unauthorized access, dan MiTM IEC 60870-5-104 isolation attack. This successful attack shows that opening the SCADA network connection that previously as closed network to other network running different protocols such as TCP/IP as stated by researchers [13]- [15] and IoT network protocols will open security holes of the SCADA system [16]. ...
... In general data packet of SCADA protocol will be encrypted in TCP protocol before transmitted. [13], [15]. Therefore, the procedure to deploy an IDS on the SCADA network is not so different from the deployment on general TCP/IP networks. ...
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) has an important role in
communication between devices in strategic industries such as power plant
grid/network. Besides, the SCADA system is now open to any external
heterogeneous networks to facilitate monitoring of industrial equipment, but
this causes a new vulnerability in the SCADA network system. Any
disruption on the SCADA system will give rise to a dangerous impact on
industrial devices. Therefore, deep research and development of reliable
intrusion detection system (IDS) for SCADA system/network is required.
Via a thorough literature review, this paper firstly discusses current security
issues of SCADA system and look closely benchmark dataset and SCADA
security holes, followed by SCADA traffic anomaly recognition using
artificial intelligence techniques and visual traffic monitoring system. Then,
touches on the encryption technique suitable for the SCADA network. In the
end, this paper gives the trend of SCADA IDS in the future and provides a
proposed model to generate a reliable IDS, this model is proposed based on
the investigation of previous researches. This paper focuses on SCADA
systems that use IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104) protocol and distributed
network protocol version 3 (DNP3) Protocol as many SCADA systems
use these two protocols.
... The researchers successfully perform IEC-104 flooding attack packet, TCP SYN DoS attack, unauthorized access, dan MiTM IEC 60870-5-104 isolation attack. This successful attack shows that opening the SCADA network connection that previously as closed network to other network running different protocols such as TCP/IP as stated by researchers [13]- [15] and IoT network protocols will open security holes of the SCADA system [16]. ...
... In general data packet of SCADA protocol will be encrypted in TCP protocol before transmitted. [13], [15]. Therefore, the procedure to deploy an IDS on the SCADA network is not so different from the deployment on general TCP/IP networks. ...
p>Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) has an important role in communication between devices in strategic industries such as power plant grid/network. Besides, the SCADA system is now open to any external heterogeneous networks to facilitate monitoring of industrial equipment, but this causes a new vulnerability in the SCADA network system. Any disruption on the SCADA system will give rise to a dangerous impact on industrial devices. Therefore, deep research and development of reliable intrusion detection system (IDS) for SCADA system/network is required. Via a thorough literature review, this paper firstly discusses current security issues of SCADA system and look closely benchmark dataset and SCADA security holes, followed by SCADA traffic anomaly recognition using artificial intelligence techniques and visual traffic monitoring system. Then, touches on the encryption technique suitable for the SCADA network. In the end, this paper gives the trend of SCADA IDS in the future and provides a proposed model to generate a reliable IDS, this model is proposed based on the investigation of previous researches. This paper focuses on SCADA systems that use IEC 60870-5-104 (IEC 104) protocol and distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) protocol as many SCADA systems use these two protocols.</p
... Today, most of the published papers, in cybersecurity and digital forensic domain, in similar domain, are focused at ICS (Industrial Control Systems), and forensic analysis in those systems, which are used worldwide in critical infrastructures. [1][2][3][4][5][6] From one side, an ICS system can be a simple single "embedded system" working standalone for controlling just one -simple process, but on the other hand, ICS can also be a very complex DCS (Distributed Control System) connected to SCADA system (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), for example, nuclear power plants, wind turbines, power systems, transport and railway controlling system, etc. ...
The digitalization process did not circumvent either railway domain. With new technology and new functionality, such as digital interlocking system, automated train operation, object recognition, GPS positioning, traditional railway domain got a vulnerability that can be exploited. Another issue is usage of CotS (Commercial-of-the-Shelf) hardware and software and openness of traditionally closed system. Most of published similar paper are focused on cyber security and security & safety model for securing of assessment in this kind of domain, but this paper will deal with this upcoming railway technology and digital investigation process in such kind of environment. Digital investigation process will be presented, but not only in ICS and SCADA system, but also in specific, railway environment. Framework for investigation process and for maintaining chain of custody in railway domain will be proposed.
... They classified attacks based on innovative impacts on SCADA components. Furthermore, Eden et al. [38] presented a global taxonomy for SCADA incidents' response. They classified system assets into five categories based on risk impact. ...
The world is experiencing exponential growth in the use of SCADA systems in many industrial fields. The increased and considerable growth in information and communication technology has been forcing SCADA organizations to shift their SCADA systems from proprietary technology and protocol-based systems into internet-based ones. This paradigm shift has also increased the risks that target SCADA systems. To protect such systems, a risk management process is needed to identify all the risks. This study presents a detailed investigation on twenty-one scientific articles, guidelines, and databases related to SCADA risk identification parameters and provides a comparative study among them. The study next proposes a comprehensive risk identification model for SCADA systems. This model was built based on the risk identification parameters of ISO 31000 risk management principles and guidelines. The model states all risk identification parameters, identifies the relationships between those parameters, and uses a hierarchical-based method to draw complete risk scenarios. In addition, the proposed model defines the interdependency risk map among all risks stated in the model. This risk map can be used in understanding the evolution of the risks through time in SCADA systems. The proposed model is then transformed into a benchmark database containing 19,163 complete risk scenarios that can affect SCADA systems. Finally, a case study is presented to demonstrate one of the usages of the proposed model and its benchmark database. This case study provides 306 possible attack scenarios that Hacktivist can use to affect SCADA systems.
... The interdependencies highlighted in Figure 1 expose the unique challenges associated with IoT and IIoT systems when compared to traditional information technology (IT) systems in terms of cyber forensics. These challenges can be generalized to six main points: (a) the unique quality of where forensic artifacts may exist is more holistic (i.e., unique evidence may exist in either/both the physical layer and the higher layers); (b) commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products have inherent vulnerabilities that have often been ignored and cybersecurity is often a retroactive measure placed on a system (Eden, Blyth, Burnap, Jones, & Stoddart, 2015); (c) many IIoT devices, and especially those used in ICS/SCADA applications, cannot be powered off to conduct forensic investigations; (d) forensic evidence is generally more volatile in industrial applications (Stirland et al., 2014); (e) forensic data for IIoT devices is generally an afterthought until such data are needed to investigate an attack and subsequently prevent a future attack-the "time to discover and unwind potential incidents can take weeks, if not months, of deep inspection by threat hunting experts" (Dragos Inc., 2018); and (f ) the specialization of specific systems and/or networks (e.g., SCADA) often requires a forensic specialist who "has to be an expert in such systems/networks … in order to identify where potential forensic evidence could be located" (Casey, 2011). This advanced review paper is not intended to represent an all-encompassing literature review in a subject area that is of great interest and which has yielded hundreds of related publications in just the past decade. ...
... IIoT forensic analysis utilizes similar forensic techniques as other applications, thus many surveys of applications that are not specific to IIoT are included here. In general, there is a lack of "tools and methodologies designed specifically to incorporate SCADA system[s], including their protocols and proprietary log formats" (Eden et al., 2015). Therefore, the major difference between general higher-layer digital forensics and those specifically applicable to IIoT is not necessarily in technique implementation itself but rather that specific system-level expertise is required to identify and collect useful data (Box 1). ...
Cross‐layer forensic investigation is addressed for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) device attacks in Critical Infrastructure (CI) applications. The operational motivation for cross‐layer investigation is provided by the desire to directly correlate bit‐level network anomaly detection with physical layer (PHY) device connectivity and/or status (normal, defective, attacked, etc.) at the time of attack. The technical motivation for developing cross‐layer techniques is motivated by (a) having considerable capability in place for Higher‐Layer Digital Forensic Information exploitation—real‐time network cyberattack and postattack analysis, (b) having considerably less capability in place for Lowest‐Layer PHY Forensic Information exploitation—the PHY domain remains largely under exploited, and (c) considering cyber‐physical integration as a means to jointly exploit higher‐layer digital and lowest‐layer PHY forensic information to maximize investigative benefit in IIoT cyber forensics. A delineation of higher‐layer digital and lowest‐layer PHY elements is provided for the standard network Open Systems Interconnection model and the specific Perdue Enterprise Reference Architecture commonly used in IIoT Industrial Control System/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition applications. A forensics work summary is provided for each delineated area based on selected representative publications and provides the basis for presenting the envisioned cross‐layer forensic investigation.
This article is categorized under:
• Digital and Multimedia Science > Cyber Threat Intelligence
• Digital and Multimedia Science > IoT Forensics
... Eden et al. [15] presents an overview of SCADA forensics process and discusses some of the existing challenges when carrying a SCADA forensics investigation. The authors propose a model for SCADA incident response and discuss ways in which the challenges can be controlled, and the process can be improved. ...
... Our review indicates major efforts by security researchers in defining the challenges of applying traditional digital forensics to SCADA systems via a number of frameworks and general methodologies [3,4,6,7,9,13,15,36,38,43,47]. However, the majority of these frameworks suffer from being too high-level or lack practical evaluation. ...
Security aspects of SCADA environments and the systems within are increasingly a center of interest to researchers and security professionals. As the rise of sophisticated and nation-state malware targeting such systems flourishes, traditional digital forensics tools struggle to transfer the same capabilities to systems lacking typical volatile memory primitives, monitoring software, and the compatible operating-system primitives necessary for conducting forensic investigations. Even worse, SCADA systems are typically not designed and implemented with security in mind, nor were they purpose-built to monitor and record system data at the granularity associated with traditional IT systems. Rather, these systems are often built to control field devices and drive industrial processes. More succinctly, SCADA systems were not designed with a primary goal of interacting with the digital world. Consequently, forensics investigators well-versed in the world of digital forensics and incident response face an array of challenges that prevent them from conducting effective forensic investigation in environments with vast amounts of critical infrastructure. In order to bring SCADA systems within the reach of the armies of digital forensics professionals and tooling already available, both researchers and practitioners need a guide to the current state-of-the-art techniques, a road-map to the challenges lying on the path forward, and insight into the future directions R&D must move towards. To that end, this paper presents a survey into the literature on digital forensics applied to SCADA systems. We cover not only the challenges to applying digital forensics to SCADA like most other reviews, but also the range of proposed frameworks, methodologies, and actual implementations in literature.
... As well known, SQL command is commonly used to communicate with the database. SQL queries can also be used for security checks such as authentication, and attackers can modify the logic of these queries to overcome the security [8]. ...
