1 China: Vertical Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Southwestern Mountain Region

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... 1992: 417) Thirty years of economic reform, by bringing about a sea change in economic life and rule of game, has unleashed forces and momenta -whether in March-June 1989, March 2008 or July 2009, whether with or without an ethnoregional content -that had caught the ruling establishment by surprise and overtaken its ability to catch up and understand and to effectively accommodate. Raised expectation of what is now perceived to be possible -paradoxically a result of the almost no-holds-barred shedding of egalitarian "socialist" State monopolistic central-planned "chi daguofan 吃大锅饭" [eating from one big wok] economic system for an unabashed rugged capitalist about-face (or, officially, "socialism with Chinese characteristics") - has fuelled the passion for speedier targeted change (see Figure 2 on typology of political action in the issue's prologue on China's social transformation) and in the context of ethnicity or ethnoterritoriality brought back the long- suppressed ghost of identity investment which the ruling establishment could be ill-prepared to accommodate (as depicted in Davies's J-curve shown in Figure 20.2). ...

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... the case of China, such public policy-induced ethnogenesis is evident in, for instance, the most assimilated of minorities, the Zhuang whose ethnic consciousness was virtually created by the Han-dominated central Communist Party-State in the early 1950s 26 , who have begun to press for preferential treatments from the central government, as the country's deadly race towards economic prosperity continues to widen economic disparities between the ethnic minorities and the Han majority, making it more and more challenging to manage ethnic nationalism and ethnoregionalism in the People's Republic ( Figure 20.3) 27 , as well as having dire implications for the prospects and consequences of further decentralization and possible federalization, a critical dimension to which this paper will later return. ...

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... terms of GDP per capita, Xinjiang is the best among them. Rural poverty is still a serious problem for Xinjiang, with rural incidence of poverty in the bracket of 5-10 per cent but not as bad as Tibet and Qinghai whose rural incidence of poverty is above 10 per cent ( Figure 20.4). In terms of urbanization, Xinjiang is also a moderate performer, ranking 17th among the country's 31 provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi 29 , compared to the least urbanized Tibet (ranked 31st) (Figure 20.5). ...

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... poverty is still a serious problem for Xinjiang, with rural incidence of poverty in the bracket of 5-10 per cent but not as bad as Tibet and Qinghai whose rural incidence of poverty is above 10 per cent ( Figure 20.4). In terms of urbanization, Xinjiang is also a moderate performer, ranking 17th among the country's 31 provinces/zizhiqu/zhixiashi 29 , compared to the least urbanized Tibet (ranked 31st) (Figure 20.5). Other key indicators, shown in Figures 20.6-20.10, ...

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... a fundamentally bi-ethnic region like Xinjiang 31 , it is apparent that the relationship between State policy and ethnic conflict and antagonism is influenced by the subordinate group's aspirations, the dominant group's orientations and their dynamic interaction. Figure 20.12 constructs a power- size configuration of ethnic groups similar to Moscovici's diagram of group power-influence configuration (Moscovici, 1985: 26). ...

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... 20.12 constructs a power- size configuration of ethnic groups similar to Moscovici's diagram of group power-influence configuration (Moscovici, 1985: 26). Based on this para- digm, a typology of multiethnic societies can be constructed, as illustrated in Figure 20.13. ...

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... case 4 which is by definition not applicable, Figure 20.13 shows a threefold typology of multiethnic societies. ...

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... Similar situation is also apparent in Tibet and Lhasa. Schermerhorn's concept of a minority mentioned above, which he redefined as a variety of ethnic group, is part of the fourfold typology he developed to take account of the numerical and the power dimensions (Schermerhorn, 1970: 13): The fourfold typology illustrated in Figure 20.14 includes not only "majority group" and "minority group", which are dominant and subordinate re- spectively in terms of both size and power, but also "élite" and "mass subjects" where numerical superiority and power do not coincide. ...

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... the fact that such configuration is rare other than internal colonization does not imply its total disappearance -two obvious examples are Rwanda and Burundi where the Hutu majorities are still politically dominated by the Tutsi minorities. Cases 2 and 3 in Figure 20.13 thus correspond to Schermerhorn's AD and BC configurations respectively. ...

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... symmetrical power relationship between groups in a society is rare and even if it emerges, tends to be transient, as observed by Hoetink, cited in the preceding section. For various reasons ranging from demographic growth to economic ethos to social mobility, one of the groups usually achieves dominance in the long run, thus pivoting the vertical lines of ethnic division into horizontal ones, as illustrated in Figure 20.15 which represents the relative positions of ethnic and class categories, but not their relative sizes, and expresses a combination of the horizontal and vertical principles of social differentiation -similar to that presented by Warner (1936) in his caste-class configuration for the US Deep South. ...

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... Chinese penetration into Xinjiang and Tibet under the CCP rule would have at first created a temporary vertical ethnic boundary positioned at d-e, indicating a system of combined equality and separation -the upper class of one ethnic group (Uyghur/Tibetan) would be equivalent to that of the other (Han), while the lower classes in each of the parallel groups would also be of the same social status. However, a possible perception of the non-Han nationalities is that the tilting of the ethnic boundary as shown in Figure 20.15 into the position A-B would have occurred somewhere along the timeline as, being an extension of the politico-economic power of the Han-dominated central State, Han economic dominance in these ethnic regions grew due to various factors including political, economic and cultural environmental preconditions, initial endowments, long-established networks, etc. 34 With the ethnic line tilted in the way shown in the diagram, within each class level to which they have risen, members of group II (Uyghur/ Tibetan) are thought of as socially inferior to members of group I (Han) of the same class, until as individuals they become assimilated (Sinicized) by the latter. ...

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... to the configuration in Figure 20.15, it should be noted that a substantial degree of horizontal interpenetration and communication across the ethnic line is indeed possible and in fact necessary for the viability of the system, thus compromising the sharpness of the line A-B as a boundary. ...

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... as Marden and Meyer (1962: 42) did for the United States, the structure of differentiation can be comprehensively expressed by superimposing the class pyramid of the subordinate ethnic group upon that of the dominant community (Figure 20.16). The former is then dropped less than a full horizontal segment to express the inferior position of each class segment of the subordinate group to others within the class. ...

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... from another angle, in contrast to the vulgar Weberian perspective which argues that the increased ability of a bureaucratic State to realize internally generated goals will reduce the power of all societal groups "outside" the State, Poulantzian neo-Marxism posits that an "autonomous" State, capable of wide ranging and coherent interventions in socioeconomic relations, increases the social power of the dominant class, whose objective and needs it necessarily functions to meet (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985). A dominant ethnic faction (Han) whose emergence in the ethnic regions is depicted earlier as inevitable in Figure 20.15, thus, in line with the latter theory, would be served by a powerful State (the country's Han-dominated one-party central State) whose interests it concurs in. ...

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... interethnic socioeconomic inequalities in ethnic regions like Xinjiang and Tibet are playing an important role in accentuating interethnic resentment and discord through expanding social distance, while contradictions, as illustrated in Figure 20.17, generated between incompatible class fractional identity and ethnic allegiance tend to breed discontent and instability. ...

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... interethnic socioeconomic inequalities in ethnic regions like Xinjiang and Tibet are playing an important role in accentuating interethnic resentment and discord through expanding social distance, while contradictions, as illustrated in Figure 20.17, generated between incompatible class fractional identity and ethnic allegiance tend to breed discontent and instability. With D denoting the dominant ethnic group, S subordinate ethnic group, E élite and M masses respectively, the vertical division in Figure 20 36 On the other hand, relations between the dominant (Han) élite and the ethnic minority (Uyghur) élite (DE-SE) could be perceived by the latter as being characterized by cronyism and clientelism 37 , while those between the dominant (Han) masses and ethnic minority (Uyghur) masses could be perceived by the latter as representing a projection of the general biases, stereotyping and mistrusts as illustrated earlier in Figure 20.15. Similar configuration is also applicable to the case of Tibet. ...

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... interethnic socioeconomic inequalities in ethnic regions like Xinjiang and Tibet are playing an important role in accentuating interethnic resentment and discord through expanding social distance, while contradictions, as illustrated in Figure 20.17, generated between incompatible class fractional identity and ethnic allegiance tend to breed discontent and instability. With D denoting the dominant ethnic group, S subordinate ethnic group, E élite and M masses respectively, the vertical division in Figure 20 36 On the other hand, relations between the dominant (Han) élite and the ethnic minority (Uyghur) élite (DE-SE) could be perceived by the latter as being characterized by cronyism and clientelism 37 , while those between the dominant (Han) masses and ethnic minority (Uyghur) masses could be perceived by the latter as representing a projection of the general biases, stereotyping and mistrusts as illustrated earlier in Figure 20.15. Similar configuration is also applicable to the case of Tibet. ...

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... configuration is also applicable to the case of Tibet. The configuration presented in Figure 20.17 is in fact based upon Bonacich's (1979: 56-57) configuration of class and ethnic relations resulting from imperialism (Figure 20.18). While segments A and C in Bonacich's model represent the "imperialist (white) bourgeoisie" and "workers in the imperialist nation" (and segments B and D refer to their non-white counterparts in the colonies and semi-colonies), in the present context they may well be the dominant ethnic bourgeoisie and proletariat whose existence is a direct consequence of internal colonization and closely linked to the interests of the dominant central State and its ruling regime. ...

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... configuration is also applicable to the case of Tibet. The configuration presented in Figure 20.17 is in fact based upon Bonacich's (1979: 56-57) configuration of class and ethnic relations resulting from imperialism (Figure 20.18). While segments A and C in Bonacich's model represent the "imperialist (white) bourgeoisie" and "workers in the imperialist nation" (and segments B and D refer to their non-white counterparts in the colonies and semi-colonies), in the present context they may well be the dominant ethnic bourgeoisie and proletariat whose existence is a direct consequence of internal colonization and closely linked to the interests of the dominant central State and its ruling regime. ...

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... segments A and C in Bonacich's model represent the "imperialist (white) bourgeoisie" and "workers in the imperialist nation" (and segments B and D refer to their non-white counterparts in the colonies and semi-colonies), in the present context they may well be the dominant ethnic bourgeoisie and proletariat whose existence is a direct consequence of internal colonization and closely linked to the interests of the dominant central State and its ruling regime. While Bonacich's model refers to classes in the Marxian sense of the word, Figure 20.17 refers to "élite" instead. ...

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... line of thought similar to Duchacek's is reflected in van Amersfoort's (1978) typology of "majority-minority" relations via a combination of the orientations of dispersed and concentrated subordinate groups with three dimensions of dominant group aspirations. Using the terms "dominant" (or "superordinate") and "subordinate" that convey more accurately the power dimension, instead of van Amersfoort's "majority" and "minority" which can be semantically confusing when size and power do not coincide, Figure 20.19 illustrates a number of probable outcomes produced S e c e s s io n is t m o ve m en t; e ve n tu a lly s e ce ss io n S e c e s s io n is t w a r S e c e s s io n is t w a r, fo rc ed a ss im ila tio n o r e xte rm in a tio n ...

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... this perspective, the goals of the dominant and subordinate groups are of particularly great importance. Figure 20.19 clearly demonstrates that a stable relationship between the dominants and subordinates free of conflict is an exception rather than a rule, since only two out of a total of twelve cells formed by the interface of dominant-subordinate orientations -those marked "emancipation process" and "federalism" -suggest the prospect of a stable form of participation in society by subordinate groups. ...

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... ibid.: 16) This means, in other words, facing up to domestic realities and pondering the possibility of transformative change (see Figure 4 and Figure 21 in Yeoh (2010) in the context of China's social transformation), without which any solution to the root problems leading to either the 1989 tragedy or recent years' Xinjiang and Lhasa riots would remain illusive. 53 Buchanan (1995: 23), writing on the path dependency of constitutional reform towards competitive federalism (Figure 20.20), remarked that any reform, constitutional or otherwise, "commences from some 'here and now,' some status quo that is the existential reality. History matters, and the historical experience of a political community is beyond any prospect of change; the constitutional-institutional record can neither be ignored nor rewritten […]" If the "here" is a centralized and unitary political authority, constitutional reform must embody devolution -a shift of genuine political power from the centre to the separate constituent political units. ...

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... Dorff, 1994: 104) Hence, the danger of fragmentation coming from democratization and federalization is real but not inevitable, as shown by the two examples illustrated in Figure 20.21. In this regard, it could be highly equivocal to keep seeing the dis- integration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union as a sword of Damocles warning against federal structures. ...