Table 4 - uploaded by Domingo Sifontes
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Source publication
The rising of independent regulatory agencies is a common characteristic of Latin America Telecommunication sector after the liberalization and privatization process carried on during the eighties. The institutional and regulatory framework of the region vary across countries. In order to compare the different design of the telecommunication regula...
Citations
... On the financial side, we consider the measure of supervisory independence, elaborated upon by Masciandaro, Quintyn, and Taylor (2008), with a sample of 55 countries, and also a classification based on a World Bank survey of a larger number of countries (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006). For telecommunications, we rely on the independence index elaborated by Gilardi (2002) for 17 European countries, which we merge with an extension to Latin American countries prepared by Sifontes (2005), using the same methodology. We also use another independence index prepared by Edwards and Waverman (2006) and extended to Latin American countries by Montoya and Trillas (2007). ...
During the 1990s, a large number of regulatory agencies were created or reformed in different sectors in Latin American countries. Almost all included political delegation mechanisms, intended as formal rules to enhance credible commitments to time-consistent policies. In this paper, using an original data set of agencies’ head tenure in the telecommunications and finance regulatory agencies, we discuss if these mechanisms worked as planned, and find a divergence between actual mandates and the formally established fixed terms, effected by means of systematic early resignations. Our findings reveal, however, some consistent patterns of behavior. Stronger legislative presidential power reduced effective delegation to some extent, and agencies’ organizational strengths protected them from patron-age. We also confirmed the existence of some significant differences be-tween the two sectors examined. Having slightly weaker delegation rules, delegation practices were also less effective in telecommunications than in financial services, contrary to expectations about credible commitments. Durante los años 1990, muchas agencias reguladoras fueron creadas o reformadas en diferentes sectores en los países latinoamericanos. Casi todas incluyeron mecanismos de delegación política, entendidos como reglas formales para mejorar los compromisos creíbles sobre políticas que requieren coherencia en el tiempo. En este trabajo, utilizando un conjunto de datos originales sobre los responsables de las agencias reguladoras de las telecomunicaciones y de las finanzas, se discute si estos mecanismos funcionaron como estaba previsto, identificándose una divergencia entre los mandatos reales y los términos formalmente establecidos, debido a la existencia de numerosas renuncias anticipadas. Nuestros hallazgos revelan, sin embargo, algunos patrones consistentes de comportamiento: un mayor poder presidencial sobre el legislativo reduce la delegación efectiva hasta cierto punto, y las fortalezas organizativas de las agencias ayudan a frente al patronazgo. También se confirma la existencia de algunas diferencias significativas entre los dos sectores objeto de estudio. Con unas normas de delegación ligeramente más débiles, las prácticas de delegación también fueron menos eficaces en las telecomunicaciones que en los servicios financieros, en contra de las expectativas sobre compromisos creíbles.
... On the financial side, we consider the measure of supervisory independence, elaborated upon by Masciandaro, Quintyn, and Taylor (2008), with a sample of 55 countries, and also a classification based on a World Bank survey of a larger number of countries (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006). For telecommunications, we rely on the independence index elaborated by Gilardi (2002) for 17 European countries, which we merge with an extension to Latin American countries prepared by Sifontes (2005), using the same methodology. We also use another independence index prepared by Edwards and Waverman (2006) and extended to Latin American countries by Montoya and Trillas (2007). ...
During the 1990s, a large number of regulatory agencies were created or reformed in different sectors in Latin American countries. Almost all included political delegation mechanisms, intended as formal rules to enhance credible commitments to time-consistent policies. In this paper, using an original data set of agencies’ head tenure in the telecommunications and finance regulatory agencies, we discuss if these mechanisms worked as planned, and find a divergence between actual mandates and the formally established fixed terms, effected by means of systematic early resignations. Our findings reveal, however, some consistent patterns of behavior. Stronger legislative presidential power reduced effective delegation to some extent, and agencies’ organizational strengths protected them from patron-age. We also confirmed the existence of some significant differences be-tween the two sectors examined. Having slightly weaker delegation rules, delegation practices were also less effective in telecommunications than in financial services, contrary to expectations about credible commitments.
Objective/Context:
This paper analyzes factors related to political incentives for public organizations to cease operations. It suggests that political turnover has a negative effect on the duration of these types of entities. However, this effect differs according to the size of the governing coalition.
Methodology:
Semi-parametric models and Cox regressions are used to estimate the survival of 415 public organizations in Colombia.
Conclusions:
The data show that a change in the presidential administration allows the new president to reshape the administration according to their interests. Data analysis also indicates that the larger the size of the government coalition, the lower the probability that a public entity will be eliminated.
Originality:
The article uses an original database containing longitudinal information on public organizations in Colombia for the period 1958 to 2020. This database contains 415 observations on the organizational characteristics of each entity. This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the termination of public organizations in Latin America.
