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For almost one decade, the academic community has been working in the design and analysis of new lightweight primitives. This cryptography development aims to provide solutions tailored for resource-constrained devices. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started an open process to create a Lightweight Cryptography Standa...
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... implement COMET using the architecture in Figure 10 for 8-bit datapath and 32-bit datapath. Two dedicated components were developed to compute shuffle and permute operations; the shuffle component computes and stores X , and stores also its original input X as it is needed to compute the feedback input to the AES. ...
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... i) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC Standardization: The major initiative has been taken by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to solicit, evaluate and standardize the quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. The NIST has begun the process in 2016 to determine the criteria and requirements for quantumsafe algorithms and announced the call for proposal [71]. The first round of submissions was announced in 2017 in which 82 submissions were received out of which 69 were announced as 1st round candidates. ...
-Quantum computer is no longer a hypothetical idea. It is the world's most important technology and there is a race among countries to get supremacy in quantum technology. It is the technology that will reduce the computing time from years to hours or even minutes. The power of quantum computing will be a great support for the scientific community. However, it raises serious threats to cybersecurity. Theoretically, all the cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to attack. The practical quantum computers, when available with millions of qubits capacity, will be able to break nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. Before the quantum computers arrive with sufficient ‘qubit’ capacity, we must be ready with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, tools, techniques, and deployment strategies to protect the ICT infrastructure. This paper discusses in detail the global effort for the design, development, and standardization of various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms along with the performance analysis of some of the potential quantum-safe algorithms. Most quantum-safe algorithms need more CPU cycles, higher runtime memory, and a large key size. The objective of the paper is to analyze the feasibility of the various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms.
... i) National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC Standardization: The major initiative has been taken by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to solicit, evaluate and standardize the quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. The NIST has begun the process in 2016 to determine the criteria and requirements for quantumsafe algorithms and announced the call for proposal [71]. The first round of submissions was announced in 2017 in which 82 submissions were received out of which 69 were announced as 1st round candidates. ...
Quantum computer is no longer a hypothetical idea. It is the worlds most important technology and there is a race among countries to get supremacy in quantum technology. Its the technology that will reduce the computing time from years to hours or even minutes. The power of quantum computing will be a great support for the scientific community. However, it raises serious threats to cybersecurity. Theoretically, all the cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to attack. The practical quantum computers, when available with millions of qubits capacity, will be able to break nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. Before the quantum computers arrive with sufficient qubit capacity, we must be ready with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, tools, techniques, and deployment strategies to protect the ICT infrastructure. This paper discusses in detail the global effort for the design, development, and standardization of various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms along with the performance analysis of some of the potential quantum-safe algorithms. Most of the quantum-safe algorithms need more CPU cycles, higher runtime memory, and large key size. The objective of the paper is to analyze the feasibility of the various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms.
... Some area-optimized implementations of AE schemes are also found in the literature. Mancillas et al. [24] implemented five AE schemes from the second round of the NIST lightweight cryptography competition. The implementation was completed according to the hardware API for lightweight cryptography, and results were generated for the Xilinx Artix-7. ...
... Although that design can reduce some hardware resources, TP and TP/A are 70% less, Table 8 show that Gimli can outperform all these implementations when TP is measured. Similarly, the Gimli cipher can generate the best TP/A ratio, compared to the AE schemes provided in [24]. In addition, the hardware area for the Gimli cipher is better than its counterparts discussed in [24]. ...
... Similarly, the Gimli cipher can generate the best TP/A ratio, compared to the AE schemes provided in [24]. In addition, the hardware area for the Gimli cipher is better than its counterparts discussed in [24]. ...
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems have bestowed numerous conveniences in a multitude of applications, but the underlying wireless communications architecture makes it vulnerable to several security threats. To mitigate these issues, various authentication protocols have been proposed. The literature accommodates comprehensive proposals and analysis of authentication protocols, but not many of them provide hardware implementations. In addition, there is diverse demand for hardware area and throughput (TP) requirements from RFID system components (tags, readers, database servers), which demand a flexible implementation strategy. This paper proposes a flexible implementation strategy for the lightweight authenticated encryption (AE) and hash function called Gimli, and applies it to a state-of-the-art authentication protocol. This allows the authentication protocol to be implemented efficiently, wherein the area and TP can be adjusted flexibly according to the RFID system requirements. This implementation strategy is generic; it can be used to implement any other AE and hash functions. This strategy can also be applied to other authentication protocols that heavily use AE and hash functions. To provide a detailed analysis, the hardware are optimization techniques in each component of the RFID system for a state-of-the-art authentication protocol are analyzed. When implemented with the most area-optimized versions, we achieve TP of 740 Mbps and 420 Mbps for Gimli hash and Gimli AE, respectively, and for throughput-oriented implementation, the results are 3.08 Gbps and 1.43 Gbps, respectively. This shows that the proposed implementation strategies allow us to implement authentication protocols in a flexible manner to meet the differing requirements in TP and area for RFID applications.
The Internet-of-things (IoT) has rapidly grown in recent years, making it an integral part of many areas of our lives. Many IoT networks require high data throughput and low latency, allowing for real-time communication and data transmission, enabling improved efficiency, cost savings, and enhanced decision-making capabilities in various industries such as manufacturing, healthcare, transportation, and smart cities. However, with the increasing amount of data being transmitted, the security of high-speed IoT networks becomes a critical concern. In this paper, we proposed a hardware architecture for Ascon, a NIST Lightweight cryptography standard to enable high-throughput, low-latency security services in IPSec protocols. Results show that the ESP protocol can achieve a maximum throughput of 8.806 Gbps and a minimum latency of 427ns for only 2812 Slice. This ESP core together with the proposed Ascon implementation can be used in IoT gateways to provide security services for high-speed, low-latency IoT networks.
