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Average tax rate and tax liability across pre-tax income distribution. Notes: PIT – personal income tax. SIC – social insurance contributions. IND – indirect taxes. For descriptions of the taxes, see Sect. 4.1. Each curve is obtained by smoothing the values on the ordinate using the LOWESS smoother (in Stata) with the default bandwidth size of 0.8. To prevent influential observations from the top and bottom of the pre-tax income distribution from affecting the shape of the curves, the top and bottom 0.1% of observations were excluded before the smoothing. Pre-tax income and tax liabilities are equivalised using the OECD-modified equivalence scale. The legend applies to both panels

Average tax rate and tax liability across pre-tax income distribution. Notes: PIT – personal income tax. SIC – social insurance contributions. IND – indirect taxes. For descriptions of the taxes, see Sect. 4.1. Each curve is obtained by smoothing the values on the ordinate using the LOWESS smoother (in Stata) with the default bandwidth size of 0.8. To prevent influential observations from the top and bottom of the pre-tax income distribution from affecting the shape of the curves, the top and bottom 0.1% of observations were excluded before the smoothing. Pre-tax income and tax liabilities are equivalised using the OECD-modified equivalence scale. The legend applies to both panels

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We develop a framework for analysing the loss of social welfare due to taxation, where tax progressivity and regressivity, measured by the Kakwani index, are given interpretation in terms of welfare gain and loss, respectively. Our framework generalises the framework of Kakwani and Son (J Econ Inequal 19:185–212, 2021), by taking account of the int...

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