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Association between the effect of individual Christian religiosity on aspirations for religion in the public domain and the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands, 1970–1996, N = 11 (Pearson's r =−.38)
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Analysis of International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data collected in 18 Western countries in 1998 demonstrates that Christian desires for a public role of religion are strongest in countries where Christian religiosity is numerically most marginal. Moreover, Dutch data covering the period 1970–1996 confirm that the decline of the number of Chri...
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... expected, the decline in the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands has been accom- panied by stronger Christian desires for a public role of religion (see Figure 5). Just like we have seen in the international comparison, then, support for a public role for religion has increased among Christians while the number of Christians itself has declined-confirming hypothesis 3. Figure 6 indicates that the impact of individual religiosity on aspirations for religion in the public domain varies across years with the proportion of Christians in a given year. Consistent with our expectations, the relationship is negative: the association between individual Christian religiosity and opinions about the public role of religion has become stronger as the number of Christians has declined. ...
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... As a result, religious individuals can better express their personal worldview, as they are less subject to external social constraints than in the earlier modern era. As a result, the religious perspective may also become more manifest in opposition to the established strategic meanings and actions of the public sphere (Beyer 1990;Casanova 1994;Achterberg et al. 2009;Glendinning and Bruce 2011). Additionally, religious meaning-making is increasingly manifest in technocratically regulated spaces. ...
This paper interprets the changing traits of religiosity in modern and postmodern societies from the perspective of spatial turn. The analysis examines the impact of social experience and action on spatial structure and how changes in spatial structure have influenced individual actions and experiences over the past decade, with a specific emphasis on the relationship to transcendence. The analysis explores the impact of the interaction of social spaces and actions on religiosity, in order to provide new insights into the interpretation of religious phenomena through a novel approach to the study of religion. It focuses on the consequences of individualisation, hybridisation, and globalisation, and analyses how these transformations are shaping contemporary religiosity in the global north. The paper argues that spatial structural changes are reinforcing more individualised forms of religiosity, often separated from traditional institutionalised religiosity. This gives greater scope to subject-organised 'patchwork religiosity', which inevitably reinforces a new kind of religious syncretism. The reflection unravels the spatial aspects of this transformation in a novel way.
... "This would mean nothing less than that secularization in one respect-declining numbers of religious individuals-would be accompanied by desecularization in another-increasing aspirations for religion in the public domain among the remaining Christians" (Achterberg et al., 2009, p. 689). The theory of religious polarization claims that the marginalization of the traditionally dominant religion, due to the secularization or strengthening of non-traditional religions, strengthens the religious identity of the religious in society, which is also reflected in the influence of religion on their views on social and political issues (Achterberg et al., 2009). Van der Brug et al. predicted an increase in the importance of religion on political behavior. ...
... Since Istria and Primorje are more strongly modernized and secularized regions than the Croatian average, based on the thesis of Achterberg et al. (2009), we assumed that ideological polarization would be more pronounced in them. ...
... In both categories of areas of socialization, the η 2 coefficient is lower in the ethno-nationalism/multiculturalism composite than in clericalism. On the first composite, the LAR influence is slightly stronger in more secularized regions, which is also in accordance with the thesis provided by Achterberg et al. (2009), on the basis of which hypothesis 3b was formulated. However, in the case of clericalism, the effect is even slightly stronger in other parts of Croatia, which is probably partly related to the historically explained subnational differences in the politicization of religion. ...
This paper analyzes the relationship between students' level of actual religiosity and their sociodemographic characteristics, political orientation, and political attitudes. The paper is based on an online survey conducted at the University of Rijeka (N = 624) in 2021. The vast majority of our respondents (90%) received the three holy sacraments of initiation in their early childhood and attended Catholic religious education at school. The explanation of the significantly less actual religiosity of students is approached from the position of Pickel's contextualized theory of secularization. Relying on Voas and Day, a composite variable distinguishes highly religious students, moderately religious students, weakly religious students, and non‐religious students on the basis of the respondents' positioning toward religious self‐identification, beliefs, Church attendance, and the importance of religion in one's life. Statistically significant correlations between actual religiosity and political orientation were established. Very religious Catholic students, who are the least numerous and the least homogenous category, are more inclined to right‐wing political orientation and reject ethno‐nationalism/anti‐multiculturalism less and accept clericalism more than other categories of students. In a broader sense, this study reveals that a large number of respondents distance themselves from religion and the Church at student age despite their experience of formal religious socialization at school age. Furthermore, the results suggest that the synergy of the liberalizing effect of education and the tolerant sociocultural atmosphere of an area reduces the influence of religiosity on the political attitudes and orientation of students.
... Addressing this gap, this study is among the first to investigate how religion shape the impact of SSU legislations, from two different angles. First, the secularization thesis (Norris and Inglehart 2004) suggest that secular contexts generally enable a more positive legislative impact, while the religious polarization thesis (Achterberg et al. 2009) argues that secularity can simultaneously widen the gap between religious and non-religious people. Second, according to the "worlds of morality politics" framework, European political parties differ in their extent of polarization on morality, governed by the GAL (green/alternative/libertarian)/TAN (traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist) cleavage. ...
... First, more secular countries are also more likely to have SSU legislations (Budde et al. 2017); however debatably, public attitudes could also be more polarized in such secular contexts due to the widening secular-religious divide in the population (Achterberg et al. 2009;Siegers 2019). Second, religion becomes focal in morality politics, when Christian or conservative political parties try to impede SSU legislations by politicizing traditional morality (Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen 2012). ...
... Religious influence tends to fade as modern science, market economy, and welfare state replaces religion's ideological, economic, and social functions (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009). However, this monotonic theory is being challenged by the religious polarization thesis stating that increasing secularization expands the polarization between religious and non-religious people (Achterberg et al. 2009). It states that under secularization, more people will leave religion by individual choice. ...
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... This "religious polarization" or "cultural backlash" is proposed to explain the ongoing rise of right-wing national conservatism in Western societies (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). The contradictions in empirical findings on whether the effect of individual religiosity is strong in more secular or more religious societies indicate that the question requires further investigation (Achterberg et al., 2009;Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009;Siegers, 2019;Storm, 2016). ...
... Moreover, many scholars argue that the impact of religion could even grow in the secular age. The theory of religious defense proposes that in a more secular context, the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes and behaviors will be stronger, i.e., a religious polarization (Achterberg et al., 2009;Hoffmann & Miller, 1997). ...
... First, as modernization theory would predict, as society further secularizes, more and more people will leave religion and stop religious practices. However, it will also lead to selfselection: the remaining religious population will be the most committed and the most adherent to traditional religious values (Achterberg et al., 2009). Second, the marginalization of religion in society could make the remaining religious perceive extra threats from the secular majority, develop a stronger religious identity, and make the symbolic boundary between the religious and the secular even more salient (Hoffmann & Miller, 1997;L. ...
European societies have experienced extensive secularization. However, the impact of religion in governing people’s political attitudes and behaviors persists, which has been enhanced by several recent developments, including the growing salience of religious and conservative values for the remaining committed religious people, the rise of radical right parties that use Christianity in their anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric, and the increasing number of immigrants from outside Europe that contribute to the diversification of religion in European societies. This dissertation investigates the continuing impact of religion on political attitudes and political behaviors in European societies under a secularizing age as embodied in those developments. I will inquire using aspects of political cleavage, political institution, and political articulation related to religion.
Study I examines how national contexts related to religion (secularization and party polarization on morality issues) moderate the impact of same-sex marriage and partnership legislation on public attitudes towards homosexuality. Using eight rounds of European Social Survey (ESS) data, the study shows that, first, in more secular countries and after partnership legislation has passed, there are more divergences in attitudes towards homosexuality between core religious members and the more secular others, with the former showing more negative attitudes. Second, in countries where political parties are more polarized on morality issues, the impact of partnership legislation is more negative in the general population across religiosity and partisanship; however, this effect is not repeated for marriage legislation. The study uncovers distinct effects of different normative institutions in moderating the relationship between legislation and attitudes through the articulation process.
Study II focuses on the mechanism underlying the relationship between Christian religiosity and voting for populist radical right parties in Europe, using ESS Round 8 data. Mediation analysis shows that the factors suggested by previous theories, including tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values and social capital, hardly explain the underrepresentation of Christians in radical right voters. On the contrary, Christians and radical right voters across Europe have high ideological compatibility in authoritarian and moral conservative values, highlighting ample political space for radical right parties to articulate within for attracting Christian support that has yet to be successfully capitalized. This finding is against Christianity itself being an antidote to the radical right. It suggests that the enduring religious cleavage linked to mainstream right parties may still explain why Christians avoid voting for radical parties.
Study III investigates the role of religion in mobilizing immigrant political participation in the context of Sweden, using the 2010 Level of Living Survey for the Foreign Born and Their Children (LNU-UFB) data. Contrasting the theoretical expectations, this study finds little evidence that religion mobilizes immigrants to participate in politics; actually, religious attendance is found to be negatively related to political participation. The demobilization effect of religion is stronger for women, first-generation migrants. Those who have experienced religion-based societal discrimination, especially Muslims, are less active in political participation. However, second-generation Muslim immigrants are more active in participating in demonstration than the first generation, possibly due to higher perceived discrimination. The results do not support the theory on religious organizations promoting immigrant political participation in Sweden, nor is there suggestive evidence for the emergence of immigrant or Muslim political cleavage in the Swedish context.
... In places where radical right parties have not governed, we have instead observed: (1) the radicalization of the mainstream right parties, such as the US Republican Party under Trump; (2) radical right parties realizing their agenda, such as the case of Brexit; or (3) mainstream parties, not limited to the right, adapt-historically dominating cultural and political significance. This is also in line with the currently debated "religious defense" thesis, which states that the Christian population will develop more religious-conservative attitudes in contrast to the rest of the population due to self-selection mechanisms and the strengthening of symbolic boundaries, as they are increasingly marginalized in society (Achterberg et al. 2009). Therefore, the current study will investigate how perceived nostalgia for the lost status of Christianity, from both individual and contextual perspectives, could be related to the anti-Muslim attitudes of Christians in Western societies. ...
... Thus, with the social and political power of Christianity dramatically declining, and the decline of, and nostalgia for, the past dominance could potentially trigger stronger hostility toward non-Christian religions, especially Muslims, with the latter growing in size and public salience, as group position theory suggests (Blumer 1958). Many theorizations, notably the "religious defense thesis" (Siegers 2019), argue that under secularization, the marginalization of the religious group, Christians in the current case, would make them more adherent to their conservatism and deviant from Christian Religious Nostalgia and Anti-Muslim Attitudes secular others given the consequence of self-selection in religion and its sharpened symbolic boundary (Achterberg et al. 2009). In a similar vein, Norris and Inglehart (2019) propose the rise of radical ethnonationalism as a response from the increasingly marginalized religious and conservative group to cultural liberalization. ...
... The literature on the consequences of secularization has also extensively emphasized the impact of contextual factors moderating individual religiosity (Siegers 2019;Vaughan 2021). With secularization enhancing the symbolic salience of religion and polarization between the religious and the secular (Achterberg et al. 2009;Siegers 2019), polarization can induce further salience and contention of the issue (Finseraas 2010;Rapp 2016). Thus, in countries where the devoted Christian population perceives more nostalgia while the secular population holds a strongly opposite view, Christianity would be more salient in the political discourse and likely to be mobilized into ethnonationalism against Muslims as the religious outgroup. ...
Radical ethnonationalism has drastically risen in Western politics, largely mobilized by nostalgia for the country's past with homogeneity and Christianity as a cultural symbol against non-Western immigrants, especially Muslims. However, how nostalgia for Christianity's past significance can invoke anti-Muslim sentiments is unknown, especially given that Christianity is increasingly losing its previous status under secularization, resulting in radical backlash from the Christian right. In the current study, I examine whether nostalgia related to religion and the religious–secular gap in the perceived status of religion can induce anti-Muslim attitudes among Christians from 20 Western countries using International Social Survey Programme data and mixed-effect multilevel modeling. Contrary to expectations, anti-Muslim attitudes are stronger for people with higher levels of Christian religiosity and doctrinal belief, and exclusivist view on religion, when they have less religious nostalgia by perceiving a stronger status of religion. Moreover, in countries with a larger religious–secular gap in the perceived status of religion, people holding exclusivist views on religion are more hostile to Muslims. Yet, the findings can still be consistent with theoretical expectations, since anti-Muslim attitudes are likely promoted through backlash from the Christian community against religious diversity, expressed in demands for a larger salience of religion rather than nostalgia.
... The positive contribution of religiosity to tolerance is influenced by economic prosperity (Achterberg et al. 2009;Inglehart 1971Inglehart , 1990Inglehart , 1997Inglehart and Baker 2000;Moore and Ovadia 2006), the politics of tolerance to reduce religious moral sentiment and revert to collectivism to optimize welfare (Kaplow and Shavell 2007;D'Angelo 2007). ...
his article aims to explore and discuss social tolerance in the pluralistic environment in urban areas. The
study was motivated by the predicate awarded to the Pamatangsiantar, one of the most tolerant cities in Indonesia in
2018 and 2019. Social tolerance, the focus of this study, is a dimension of democratic values. The theoretical basis
referred to is democratic personalities and religious freedom. The study was carried out using a qualitative method,
based on a pragmatic methodological approach to historical and contemporary paradigms. The data was collected
through participatory observation, in-depth interviews, and questionnaires. All data went through in-depth analysis
according to the descriptive-qualitative paradigm. The study found delicate (“ahap”), a dimension of democratic
values, had inspired delicately (“marahap”), the characteristic of democratic personalities to produce vigilance
(“saahap”), attitude, and mental structure to tolerate. The conclusion of this study is an intersection of religious,
ethnic, and cultural attributes to accommodate the existing differences. Democratic personalities, the basic
characteristics of social tolerance are a logical consequence of historical experiences, blood relations, and
contributions tolerant figures
... The challenges secular societies face when integrating new religious migrants are evidenced by cultural and political clashes between Muslims and secular states. European Muslims have challenged secular interpretations of religion-state relations, approaches to pluralism and religious rights (Achterberg et al. 2009;Asad 2008;Balibar 2004;Body-Gendrot 2007;Casanova 2012;Cesari 2011;Glendinning and Bruce 2011;Luckmann 1967;Modood 2009;Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2017). Consistent with this line of reasoning, I hypothesize: ...
Religious communities can encourage generosity toward strangers. In these communities, such norms are high among religious individuals and nonadherents. It remains unclear how these norms inform policy. Recent refugee crises provide critical tests of how charitable values translate into political preferences. As Europe experiences turmoil over the acceptance and integration of Muslim refugees, I ask how religion affects preferences regarding refugee admissions. I find that marginalized religious groups among new immigrants offer the highest levels of support for admitting refugees. Catholics are more restrictive than religious nones regarding policy preferences, while there are mixed results comparing nones to other Christian denominations. However, for Catholics and most other Christians, generous policy preferences increase with higher rates of religious service attendance. Respondents offer more generous policy preferences in regions with higher rates of Protestant and Catholic affiliation and in nations with higher Protestant affiliation. Restrictive preferences increase with regional and national percent unaffiliated.
... Because of that, vast non-religious majorities in highly secularized Western European countries are likely to consider both religion and its diminishing carrier group not only outdated and old-fashioned, but also socially and politically insignificant, marginalized, and no longer in need of protesting or fighting against (Achterberg et al., 2009;Ribberink, Achterberg and Houtman, 2013). This might explain why secularized European societies do clash over other types of cultural issues, rather than those related to religion. ...
... This might explain why secularized European societies do clash over other types of cultural issues, rather than those related to religion. The irrelevance of religion in secularized Western Europe can be illustrated by the political parties of the New Left and the New Right that, despite their major disagreements about how to deal with immigration, ethnic diversity and law and order, basically agree about the need to defend the 'secularist truce'the modern social contract that bans religion from the public sphere of party competition to the private realm (Achterberg et al., 2009). ...
Studies on cultural divisions in Western European politics typically combine two different value divides. The first divide is moral traditionalism versus progressiveness, which pits the religious and the secular against each other on matters of procreation, family and gender roles. The second one is authoritarianism versus libertarianism, which captures the opposition between the high-and low-educated about basically secular attitudes towards matters of immigration, law and order. Since the first divide is religiously inspired and the second one is basically secular, this paper systematically distinguishes between them and studies whether secularization in Western Europe affects them differently. We perform multilevel regression analysis using the European Values Study data (four waves, 1981-2008) for seventeen Western European countries. Our findings show that the divide between the religious and the secular about moral issues declines with secularization, while the divide between the high-and low-educated about secular issues, on the opposite, becomes wider.
... While in the 1970s, advocates of personal liberty still primarily faced religious and morally traditionalist adversaries, from the 1980s onwards their enemies increasingly tended to have exclusively secular authoritarian profiles. Since the 1960s, then, religion and moral traditionalism have not only massively declined but have in the process also lost much of their former political salience, giving way to a redefinition of problems of social order in a secular direction (Akkerman 2005;Achterberg 2009). Yet, it is clear that religion and moral traditionalism have not disappeared in even the most secularized Western-European countries (Halman and Draulans 2006) and it would be similarly wrong to assert that the authoritarianism-libertarianism divide did not exist before the 1980s (see for instance Lipset (1959) on working-class authoritarianism). ...
Moral traditionalism versus progressiveness and secular authoritarianism versus libertarianism are often understood as central to the same “new” cultural cleavage in politics. Despite the often-found sizable correlations between these two cultural value divides, the present paper theorizes that this relationship is not a cross-contextual constant, but rather a specific feature of secularized contexts where moral traditionalism is relatively marginal. We test this theory by means of a two-stage statistical analysis of the data from the four waves of the European Values Study (1981–2008) for 17 Western European countries. Our findings confirm that the two value divides are most strongly connected in the most secularized contexts because the latter are least morally traditionalist. While the two cultural divides hence tend to be distinct in more religious Western-European countries, they tend to coalesce into one single “new” cultural divide in more secular ones.
... The combination of these two factors will perhaps intensify the emerging polarization of the Canadian religious landscape (Bibby 2011;Reimer 2017;Wilkins-Laflamme 2014. The concept of religious polarization is one of the newest developments in the scientific study of religion in Western countries (Achterberg et al. 2009;Kaufmann et al. 2012;Ribberink et al. 2013;Wilkins-Laflamme 2014). The examination of the effects of the differences in fertility rates by the degree of both religiosity and secularity, rather than the affiliation status alone, on the emergence of a religiously polarized landscape appears to be a meaningful future contribution to the field. ...
Using several cycles of the Canadian General Social Survey covering cohorts born from the early 1900s onwards, this paper examines how religiosity and secularity associate with fertility in Canada. The analysis shows that among multiple dimensions of religiosity, religious attendance is the strongest predictor of higher fertility in the country. For the latest cycle conducted in 2011, three mutually exclusive groups of secularized women are compared with the actively religious in their fertility behaviour and intentions. All these secularized women are found to have lower fertility rates compared with the actively religious. Among them, the strictly seculars, a proxy identifier for the atheists, have the lowest fertility and the highest likelihood of remaining childless. Various implications are discussed.
