Figure - available from: Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
This content is subject to copyright.
Artistic representation of the basal and forebrain regions in the vertebrates (Image credits to Massimo Bergamasco). Lateral view (Left panel) and mid-sagittal view (right panel) of the brain of: (A) rainbow trout, Salmo gairdneri; (B) green frog, Rana esculenta; (C) tegu lizard, Tupinambis teguixin; (D) pigeon, Columba livia; (E) cat; and (F) human brain. For each vertebrate brain, the basal subcortical regions is highlighted (in orange) in the mid-sagittal views.
Source publication
Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological da...
Similar publications
Purpose:
Venous angioma (VA) is the most common congenital abnormality of the intracranial vasculature. This study aimed to investigate the relationship between VA and epilepsy and to identify the characteristics of children with VA and epilepsy.
Methods:
The records of all patients aged less than 18 years who underwent brain magnetic resonance...
Reversible splenial lesion syndrome (RESLES) has largely been described in encephalitis/encephalopa-thy. It is typically characterized by transient focal reversible symmetrical lesions, and show T2 hyperintensity with corresponding diffusion restriction and no contrast enhancement in the splenium of the corpus callosum (SCC) on magnetic resonance i...
A closed head trauma induces incompletely characterized temporary movement and deformation of the brain, contributing to the primary traumatic brain injury. We used the pressure patterns recorded with light-operated miniature sensors in anaesthetized adult rabbits exposed to a sagittal plane rotational acceleration of the head, lasting 1 ms, as a m...
In the present study, we performed a comprehensive analysis to clarify the clinicopathological characteristics of patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that had progressed to result in a totally locked-in state (communication Stage V), in which all voluntary movements are lost and communication is impossible. In 11 patients, six had pho...
Exposure to blast waves is suspected to cause primary traumatic brain injury. However, existing finite-element (FE) models of the rat head lack the necessary fidelity to characterize the biomechanical responses in the brain due to blast exposure. They neglect to represent the cerebral vasculature, which increases brain stiffness, and lack the appro...
Citations
... The contours of the self may not be real, but the brain may treat them as if they were, like it would, while viewing or imagining a table or a ball. Self-awareness, or the ability to distinguish oneself from others may have emerged relatively recently in evolution, being present in largebrained mammals such as chimpanzees and dolphins (Fabbro et al., 2015). One of the common tests to examine self-awareness in animals is the mirror, self-recognition task, which involves placing a mark on an animal's body and showing it to a mirror. ...
Humans have asked themselves the question “who am I” from ancient times. Vedic, upanishadic and buddhist philosophers have pointed out over millennia the illusive nature of the individual self, and posit either a no-self, or a universal Self. Vedantic scholars also posit the illusory nature of the universe (Maya) and suggest that the only reality is the knower (Brahman), a view resonating with modern concepts in quantum theory. On the other hand, western philosophers, notably influenced by the Cartesian dualism, have pursued an individualist view of the self. Recent psychological literature is convergent with eastern views and emphasizes the importance of understanding the self, metacognition and mindful practices to understand the mind and its afflictions. Several recent western psychotherapeutic models resonate with, and may have been motivated, at least in part, by ancient eastern philosophy and spiritual practices. More work is needed to develop and implement psychotherapeutic approaches using eastern insights, and to empirically test their effectiveness.
... Where they disagree in on whether subcortical structures are also sufficient to generate conscious emotional experiences, a claim which is accepted by 'affective neuroscience' approaches but rejected by 'cognitive neuroscience' ones (Panksepp et al., 2017). Here I adopt the view from affective neuroscience, which, despite still being a minority view in neuroscience, is better supported by evolutionary considerations (see for instance Fabbro et al., 2015;Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016;Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019;Godfrey-Smith, 2019. On this view, consciousness, an in particular interoceptive awareness, is an ancient evolved feature of animals that, in vertebrates, is primarily instantiated in subcortical structures, including in particular the brainstem and hypothalamus. ...
... The brainstem is not a passive transmitter of signals between the body proper and the upper brain, and is not restricted to basic maintenance of vital functions. It also has important roles in the generation of sentience, pain, awareness, and consciousness, and it instantiates the primary layer of self (Damasio, 2010;Fabbro et al., 2015). Areas in the brainstem and hypothalamus are essential for the experience of emotions (Damasio et al., 2000;Merker, 2007;Venkatraman et al., 2017). ...
... 201-208;Parvizi & Damasio, 2001). It implies a sense of ownership and agency, and some knowledge of the world in the form of semantic memory (Fabbro et al., 2015). Above this layer, Damasio identifies the autobiographical self as distinctly human (2010, p. 210), whereas Panksepp and others divide this section of the self into two sub-layers: self-consciousness, which is typically attributed to animals who are able to recognise themselves in a mirror, and the narrative self, which requires language, and is therefore likely to be restricted to humans (Fabbro et al., 2015). ...
Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity.
... Conscious awareness is categorized, according to a stepwise developmental process beginning with basic awareness of the external environment, followed by awareness of one's body, and finally, higher-order internal awareness of oneself (such as mindwandering or daydreaming, associated with the Default Mode Network) (97). The emergence of consciousness occurs along a continuum (27) and has been likened to a dimmer switch beginning with a minimum basic consciousness, mediated by subcortical structures (98,99) and possibly the subplate (4), to higher order consciousness associated with cortical processing and decision-making ( Figure 9) (98, 100). Neuroscientists hold that basic conscious awareness requires the subjective ability to evaluate the environment and form coordinated responses (101) and may be demonstrated via action planning, learning, and purposeful movement (100). ...
Controversy exists as to when conscious pain perception in the fetus may begin. According to the hypothesis of cortical necessity, thalamocortical connections, which do not form until after 24-28 weeks gestation, are necessary for conscious pain perception. However, anesthesiologists and neonatologists treat age-matched neonates as both conscious and pain-capable due to observable and measurable behavioral, hormonal, and physiologic indicators of pain. In preterm infants, these multimodal indicators of pain are uncontroversial, and their presence, despite occurring prior to functional thalamocortical connections, has guided the use of analgesics in neonatology and fetal surgery for decades. However, some medical groups state that below 24 weeks gestation, there is no pain capacity. Thus, a paradox exists in the disparate acknowledgment of pain capability in overlapping patient populations. Brain networks vary by age. During the first and second trimesters, the cortical subplate, a unique structure that is present only during fetal and early neonatal development, forms the first cortical network. In the third trimester, the cortical plate assumes this function. According to the subplate modulation hypothesis, a network of connections to the subplate and subcortical structures is sufficient to facilitate conscious pain perception in the fetus and the preterm neonate prior to 24 weeks gestation. Therefore, similar to other fetal and neonatal systems that have a transitional phase (i.e., circulatory system), there is now strong evidence for transitional developmental phases of fetal and neonatal pain circuitry.
... Etinson (2020), p. 372.20 Fabbro et al. (2015). ...
When deciding about legal subjectivity, one should focus on the fact that the law is not only a human endeavour, but more importantly, a social one. Therefore, an object is regarded as a subject of law only when it participates, or is present, in social life and is believed to be socially valuable; it is not the case that being a subject of law allows participation in social life and having value. As AI is, or will soon become, a participant in social life and thus is or will be attributed with intrinsic or utility value for social relations, it should be endowed with legal subjectivity. However, the legal subjectivity of AI doesn’t have to be similar to human legal subjectivity or the legal subjectivity of juridical persons. It should be punctual, contextual, and limited only to those domains of AI activity in which AI can be justifiably granted subjectivity based on its social role. It is an is inescapable fact that AI will eventually be endowed with subjectivity of some kind, and the earlier we start to think about it, the more ideas are possible. The process of changing the law should accompany technological and social change.
... Etinson (2020), p. 372.20 Fabbro et al. (2015). ...
Asimov’s Laws have been often taken as a starting point for reflection on liability of AI, one example being the EP resolution of 16 February 2017 on Civil Law Rules on Robotics. However, the analysis made herein shows that this way of proceeding is not effective. Furthermore, the mostly recommended model for liability of the producer of AI, or another person responsible for AI, or the AI itself, is a strict liability regime. In addition to reflecting on the issue of legally-relevant damage caused by AI, the chapter examines the problem associated with establishing a causative link between action of AI and damage and the questions of negligence and standard of conduct for AI. It argues that there are some nontrivial situations involving AI when fault liability could be useful. For this reason, it contains a proposal of some new understanding of legal culpability, when this concept is applied to AI. The proposal is consistent with the concepts proposed in the previous chapters, such as the concept of legal subjectivity of AI, the capability for juridical actions of AI, the equivalent of free will and the discernment of AI.
... Etinson (2020), p. 372.20 Fabbro et al. (2015). ...
The achievements of AI are particularly spectacular in the domain of Art, especially since artistic activities have long been thought to be the preserve of humans alone. This and other creative activities of AIs present copyright law with an unexpectedly new and very difficult dilemma: whether a “work” created by AI can be subject to copyright protection, and if so, who should hold the copyright to it. An effective study of the problem of robot creative works should, and perhaps must, combine perspectives from both private and public law. The authors are of the opinion that an AI should be granted the right of authorship. Then it would be necessary to decide whether, and to what extent, the works of robots would belong to the public domain, and to what extent copyright property rights would be vested in entities we would consider to have a moral title to these rights, be it ownership of the AI-associated robot, or making creative or financial contributions to its abilities. Finally, the chapter lists possible instruments for public redistribution of the profits coming from the creative activity of AI.
... Etinson (2020), p. 372.20 Fabbro et al. (2015). ...
The growth of Artificial Intelligence (in the remainder of this book called “AI”) and robotics in recent years has highlighted the pressing need to create a suitable legal framework. The debate on the subject is presently of quite general and preliminary character, despite many European acts and proposals for acts, and a plenitude of scientific books, reports and articles: its most important fields are being slowly defined, with the most pressing goal being the definition of the ethical foundations underpinning the further expansion of AI. In these preparatory works, there is a clear need to develop appropriate new civil law arrangements. Of all the branches of private law it is this one that has the greatest need for the settlement of new rules. Autonomous vehicles, medical robots, or expertise software demand essential questions on aspects of civil liability, such as culpability; in addition the growth in popularity of automated, intelligent software systems for concluding contracts requires a new approach to be taken to many fundamental and rooted contract law institutions, inter alia consciousness, intent, error, deception, interpretation of contract and good faith. Ruling on these specific matters demands the crystallisation of certain key points, which shall become the foundation for constructing a new AI/robot civil law. However, the current discussion on the civil law and AI is sketchy, superficial and lacks any reasonable order. A holistic coherent view on the issue of the civil law bases for the participation of AI in legal transactions is still lacking.
... Etinson (2020), p. 372.20 Fabbro et al. (2015). ...
When an AI is an autonomous entity to some extent, any contract concluded by an AI, with the use of an AI or performed with an AI raises a number of questions for civil law about the adequacy of traditionally-developed constructions and concepts. If the AI were allowed to act as a person or quasi-person in its own name, but on behalf of a third party, it cannot be given a general power to enter into contractual relations: the choice of whether to enter into a contract, with whom and with what content. The scope of activity of an AI system must be precisely defined in advance, thus controlling and limiting its possible sphere of action in trading. It is also necessary to define the content and the significance of subjective circumstances on the part of AI while contracting, to revise the ways of interpreting contracts involving AI, to establish new due diligence in contracts involving AI, to review the performance of contracts by AI, and to reflect on the information obligation concerning the use of AI while contracting and performing the contract.
... The vertebrate retina is an integral part of the CNS (Rodieck, 1998;Dowling, 2012; see also http://webvision.med.utah.edu/) and functions as the first element of three different visual systems: (1) an image-forming visual system in which parallel signals from the retina reach sub-cortical regions of the brain such as the superior colliculus (optic tectum) enabling the non-conscious location of food and other objects, avoidance of predators, etc (Schneider, 1969;Fabbro et al., 2015); 2) a second image-forming visual system in which parallel channels from the retina reach the visual cortex allowing conscious perception of the visual environment (Rodieck, 1998;Dowling, 2012); and (3) the non-image-forming visual system, also called non-visual system, in which the retinal output signals the ambient light level in the day and controls non-conscious visual tasks such as the pupillary light reflex and circadian photoentrainment (Moore, 1996). In particular, the photic information that entrains the circadian system synchronizes many rhythmic physiological functions of organisms with the local environment. ...
Circadian (24-h) clocks are cell-autonomous biological oscillators that orchestrate many aspects of our physiology on a daily basis. Numerous circadian rhythms in mammalian and non-mammalian retinas have been observed and the presence of an endogenous circadian clock has been demonstrated. However, how the clock and associated rhythms assemble into pathways that support and control retina function remains largely unknown. Our goal here is to review the current status of our knowledge and evaluate recent advances. We describe many previously-observed retinal rhythms, including circadian rhythms of morphology, biochemistry, physiology, and gene expression. We evaluate evidence concerning the location and molecular machinery of the retinal circadian clock, as well as consider findings that suggest the presence of multiple clocks. Our primary focus though is to describe in depth circadian rhythms in the light responses of retinal neurons with an emphasis on clock control of rod and cone pathways. We examine evidence that specific biochemical mechanisms produce these daily light response changes. We also discuss evidence for the presence of multiple circadian retinal pathways involving rhythms in neurotransmitter activity, transmitter receptors, metabolism, and pH. We focus on distinct actions of two dopamine receptor systems in the outer retina, a dopamine D4 receptor system that mediates circadian control of rod/cone gap junction coupling and a dopamine D1 receptor system that mediates non-circadian, light/dark adaptive regulation of gap junction coupling between horizontal cells. Finally, we evaluate the role of circadian rhythmicity in retinal degeneration and suggest future directions for the field of retinal circadian biology.
... L'evoluzione del linguaggio è stata anche collegata allo sviluppo della coscienza autonoetica, o autocoscienza, che può essere definita come la capacità di rappresentarsi contemporaneamente come soggetti e oggetti del processo cognitivo (Edelman, 1992;Panksepp e Biven, 2012;Fabbro et al., 2015). In virtù di questa coscienza autonoetica, l'attività dell'immaginazione si radica su un nucleo di identità personale, l'io, che mantiene una stabilità e una continuità nello spazio-tempo e al quale è possibile collegare una serie di ricordi episodi (consci e inconsci). ...
Sulla nave che lo portava verso le Clark lectures negli Stati Uniti, Jung racconta a Freud un sogno, divenuto famoso, in cui una casa a quattro piani, o livelli, sembra rappresentare la struttura di una psiche fondata sull'inconscio archetipico. Nonostante l'idea di archetipo sia stata più volte oggetto di critiche, a partire dalla seconda metà del 1900 gli studi scientifici sull'organizzazione del cervello umano hanno confermato l'ipotesi di una stratificazione delle funzioni mentali e di una determinazione prevalentemente istintuale ed ereditaria del primo e più antico strato dell'evoluzione neuropsichica. Pertanto, riprendendo la struttura della casa sognata da Jung, in questo articolo proponiamo l'idea di una stratificazione psico-neuro-archeologica suddivisa in 3+1 strati sovrapposti che costituisce una elaborazione del modello neuro-archeologico ternario elaborato da Paul MacLean prima e da Jaak Panksepp poi, in cui l'affettività rappresenta il fattore organizzativo fondamentale del cervello-mente. Lo strato più evoluto, caratteristico della specie umana, è quello dell'auto-coscienza riflessiva. Subito sotto si trova il livello della coscienza intersoggettiva, caratteristico delle specie omeoterme (mammiferi ed uccelli) e legato all'evoluzione di un complesso di strutture corticali mediali chiamate Default-Mode-Network. Ancora sotto si trova lo strato della coscienza cognitivo-immaginativa, evolutasi nei vertebrati dotati di corteccia cerebrale. Infine, il primo e più antico strato, è quello della consapevolezza affettiva, legato al funzionamento delle strutture sottocorticali mediali (core-Self), dove risiedono i circuiti istintuali ed archetipici individuati negli studi neuro-etologici di Panksepp.
